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Time became a key-concept for philosophy in the twentieth century, mainly after Einstein’s 
propositions on Special Relativity, and the effects of this paradigm shift are well known in all artistic 
manifestations. However, in music—maybe the art more dependent on time—a myriad of 
definitions did turn this idea not only into a rich element for musical discourse but also into a 
conceptual battlefield in discourses about music. Unfortunately, there was an issue for this 
struggle between theoretical ideas and musical composition that always insisted in striking the 
debate: the performance. The world of ideas has not much interest in the carnality of musical 
performance, and for this reason, it was constantly put aside in all that vivid discussion, especially 
if taken from the standpoint of performers. Thus, this is the aim of this short reflection: to bring 
performers as actors into the debate, listening to their experience in time and of time in the 
momentum of performance. For this, the Augustinian link between Time and Memory is taken as 
a bottom line for the discussion. In understanding music as a kind of discourse, another important 
conceptual device will be claimed for this reflection, that is Rhetoric. Along with Rhetoric comes the 
Aristotelian concept of discursive time not following the Latin dichotomy between Time and 
Eternity, but after the third category from the Greeks, kairós, a concept closer to the definition 
defended here. The first part of this reflection, therefore, recollects concepts from the Aristotelian 
and Augustinian approaches on time and discourse, and concludes with a review of the main 
491 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 4 (2) (2019) 
definitions of time by composers in the twentieth century. The second part reviews three 
theoretical approaches of musical form as process (those of Edward Cone, Fritz Noske and Boris 
Asafiev), more adequate to the experience of time in performance. This review, thus, attempts to 
formulate a device for describing this experience in musical analysis, i.e., in the discourse about 
music. After the conceptual and the methodological reviews, a third section comprises the 
embodiment of those discussions into practice. The piece of music chosen as the object of analysis 
and reflection is the Cello Sonata, written by German composer Bernd Alois Zimmermann at the 
same time of his influential text Intervall und Zeit, and will be taken as reference for the discussion 
too. In bringing the performer back as a fundamental instance for music, this article aims, finally, 
to make a point on the convergence of past, present and future that happens on the stage, where 
memory relates the last line to the next while performing in the present, which leads to the concept 
of an extended present. This is the core of the argument: that living the performance of a piece of 
music is the way to have access to its meaning and, therefore, to its singularity of time. For this 
reason, we suggest that the reader, for engaging in the journey of this article properly, watches the 
performance of Zimmermann’s Sonata by this author (William Teixeira) on YouTube: 
1. From the sounds of the house to the images of the palace
 “In the beginning.” The founding myth, where, in an incipient way, Augustine believed, space and 
matter were instituted (Augustine 2016 [c.400], 11:3, 5). Both created in the primordial temple, the 
beginning. This is therefore the first creation, the beginning: the time. In fact, the adverbial phrase 
“in the beginning” is in ancient Hebrew a single term, bereshít (בראשית), the first word of the Holy 
Scriptures. The first letter of them, bet (ב), has the same pronunciation of the term for “house,” 
which is the reason why, along with the letter format itself, the rabbis understood time in the 
Midrash as the “house of creation” (Ogren 2016, 129). 
In the house of all the things, cosmos finds its existence. In the same way, music happens in time 
as the whole world, but somehow it seems to indwell more intensively in that dimension of reality 
than the rest of creation. If, together with Augustine, it seems necessary to recognize the 
impossibility of full access to the understanding of what this house is, then it is possible to reach 
at least its vestibules, or, as he preferred, its palace, the Palace of Memory (Augustine 2016, 10:8, 
12). 
Time and Memory are binomials of the same reality, concepts separated by perspective rather 
than by their place in existence. If the former seems to deal more with physical realities, and the 
latter with cognitive ones, it may be that they deal only with different levels of duration of the 
movements of reality, as Henri Bergson would suggest. 1  In any case, to such concepts are 
restricted human action and interpretation, so it is not possible to exempt us from an examination 
of their nature, or, minimally, from the possibility of knowledge of and relationship with this nature. 
Watch and listen to Teixeira play Zimmermann’s sonata 
https://youtu.be/9oeIej9llQ0?t=137 
492 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 4 (2) (2019) 
Classical rhetoric was born in the philosophical context of Ancient Greece, which understood Time 
as three different meanings: aeon, the time of eternity, or the timelessness; chronos, the 
quantitative and metric time; kairós, the qualitative and momentary time. The important thing is 
that it was exactly on the third concept of time, the kairós, that Aristotle situated rhetorical 
discourse, especially in his discussion on the stage of formal elaboration, the dispositio. In the 
fourth part of the rhetoric, memory receives the place of the memoratio, the proper space for its 
investigation and practice within the discursive act. Although in its first three parts rhetoric already 
deals with the question of the time and place of discourse with regard to its conception and 
structuring (inventio, dispositio, and elocutio), its last two parts are dedicated to the performance of 
discourse (memoratio and actio). This dimension receives more attention and importance. 
In the systematic way the Latins worked rhetoric, the memoratio appears not only as a study of 
argumentative processes but also as an art of oratory. However, even in its development in Ancient 
Greece, memory was an aspect present in the discussions about the means of persuasion, 
especially, as Cicero and Quintilian credited, for Simonides, the poet inventor of the art of 
memorizing things and words. The earliest fragment about memory as a discursive ability is 
his Dialexeis, from 400 BCE, which already seems to contain the sum of what the Latins would 
sophisticate and systematize, as follows: 
A great and beautiful invention is memory, always useful both for 
learning and for life. 
This is the first thing: if you pay attention (direct your mind), the judgment will 
better perceive the things going through it (the mind). 
Secondly, repeat again what you hear; for by often hearing and saying the same 
things, what you have learned comes complete into your memory.  
Thirdly, what you hear, place on what you know. For example, Χρύσιππος 
(Chrysippus) is to be remembered; we place it on χρυσό (gold) and Ἵππος (horse). 
Another example: we place πυγολαμπίδα (glow-worm) on  πυρ (fire) and λάμψη 
(shine).  
So much for names.  
For things (do) thus: for courage (place it) on Mars and Achilles; for metal-working, 
on Vulcan; for cowardice, on Epeus. 
(Simonides cited in Yates 1966, 29–30) 
These early sayings from Greek wisdom seem to foretell not only the seeds of what would 
constitute the art of memory in Latin rhetoric, but even the descriptive knowledge that 
neuroscience would attain in the Twentieth century about the cognitive functioning of neural 
mechanisms in their different levels of retention, especially in the practice of memorized content 
(Lent 2002, 648). Memorization thus begins to gain the airs of technique, from its process of 
association with images that would entail words and things to be remembered, resulting in its 
consideration by the anonymous author of the treatise destined for Herenius as “the treasure of 
things invented” (Cicero [pseudo] [c. 80 BCE] 1953, 83). 
This artificial memory, as it was distinguished from natural memory, was not a mere set of 
mnemonic mechanisms that aimed to record a discourse already conceived, but part of the 
493 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 4 (2) (2019) 
process of invention itself; new images and places would reconfigure the existing 
discourse. Moreover, these processes dealt much more with places and keywords than with the 
syntactic fullness of a discourse, acting as a guide to improvisation and not as a rule for 
enunciation. Thus, the practice of composition by memory outside the written medium was 
emphasized mainly in the Middle Ages, creating discourses from a previous set of structures 
already known, reshaping them and resetting them. In fact, rhetorical topics appear more like a 
reunion of these places (from the Greek topoi) than as a group of structures of purely referential 
meaning (Crowley and Hahwee 2004, 318). 
This preamble through Ancient rhetoric helps make the point that the same practice could be easily 
transposed to the musical discourse. In music, memoratio also assumed this double role, both as 
a mnemonic device and as a standard of musical invention. Even in Ancient Greece, such a 
relationship was similar. Just remember that the Muses, from which comes the term “music,” are 
daughters of Zeus with Mnemosyne, the titanid daughter of Uranus and Gaia, the personification 
of Memory—music: daughter of god with memory (Gusmão 2016, 10). 
Aristotle advances an inquiry on memory in his Parva naturalia, understanding it as the capacity to 
form phantasmatos, that is to say, images, mainly from other previous images. But it is not enough 
to form such images, for it is also necessary to attribute a temporal duration to this image, knowing 
its before and after, that is, temporally relating it to reality. Not that this relationship is metric, but, 
rather, that it can relate proportionally the farthest from the nearest, even if one does not know 
how far one image is from the other. The philosopher gives the example of two triangles (Fig. 1), 
where both have a vertex A in common. Taking A for granted, one knows that the ratio of A:E is 
equal to E:B, and that the same reasoning occurs in the second triangle, also allowing the passage 
from one to the other. To this reasoning, Aristotle gives the name of motion (kinesis), this effort to 
connect two images from a point and to connect such image and the present (Gusmão 2016, 18). 
Gusmão (2016) points to an important consequence of this Aristotelian thought for music coming 
from the contribution of his disciple Aristoxenus, who takes the idea of phantasmatos not only for 
the visual image but also for the melos, “the image of sensation” (της αἰσθεσεως φαντασιαν) 
(Gusmão 2016, 19). From this point, Aristoxenus continues his development already known within 
Greek musical theory, but it is helpful to remember that the term melos does not have a meaning 
only associated with the melodic aspect of the music; it first designates a part of a 
body. The melos are limbs, just like the harmos are articulatory joints. Therefore, it is not necessary 
Fig. 1: Representation of Aristotle's proposal of movement from memory 
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to suggest that the Aristotelian idea of the forces of memory acting in the apprehension of a 
movement depends, in music, on the existence of melodic structures, but simply on the existence 
of a part of the music, whether they are sonorities or musical gestures. 
During the Middle Ages, memoratio was practiced in music in a manner equivalent to verbal 
discourse. Its mnemonic technique was present as a means of recording and re-creating the music 
from the succession of places that certain musical clauses inhabit. Perhaps the practice reached 
its technical apex in the music of the School of Notre Dame in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. 
This is, however, ironical, because if one remembers the great names of Leonin and Perotin, this 
was more due to the failures of the students in their process of memorization than by a will or 
need of them of writing their own music (Berger 2005). Avoiding Eurocentrism, however, it is 
important to relate the polyphonic creation to dozens of voices of the French school, performed 
almost improvisationally from the inventive-mnemonic places, to that made by the African people 
Banda Linda, as researched by the ethnomusicologist Simha Aron in the last century, given its 
similar complexity and its constitutive normative aspects driven by mnemonic and gestural 
records. 
Even the famous Guidonian hand, a gestural device for recording notes, rising in the Middle Ages 
for storing the musical pitches and their organization, like so many other hand models, served as 
support for recording music information as clefs or rules of prosody, just as today one uses the 
hand to remember how many days are contained by each month of the year (Berger 1981). In the 
Renaissance, the access to printing and paper minimized the role of memory, and caused the 
development of musical writing; for this reason, music became more dependent on material 
support like the musical score (Lorenzetti 2016). Even so, it was expected that the diminution 
patterns of the many treatises on the subject would be recorded by memory, allowing its 
application in the most different musical situations, as was the case in the Baroque in relation to 
ornamentation. 
In Romanticism, musical writing emancipated itself as the creative instance par excellence, being 
the simulacrum of the inspired genius, while simultaneously the performer tried to take for himself 
this post of inspired genius who magically created the musical discourse he performed. If 
Beethoven once used the score to play his own sonatas, a few years later Clara Wieck Schumann 
and Franz Liszt would give it up to instill a new dimension in musical performance by playing music 
written by another without the other's writing. The presence of the composer in the score gives 
way to the interpretation of this score, as memorized by the performer, thus creating a practice 
that would become part of the musical tradition. 
There is no denying, of course, that the performance by memory as preconized by musicians in 
Romanticism has a great effect on the audience, and for that reason, it has remarkable oratorical 
effectiveness. However, it is possible to question which type of ethics belongs to this set of effects 
produced and eventually intended by this type of performance. Most of the studies, when in favor 
of such a practice, argue that memorization frees the performer and allows one to focus on other 
aspects of performance (Williamon 2002). The question, however, is from what does it set the 
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performer free? It is clear that a sight-reading is not considered here as an option, but, rather, a 
stage of preparation that gives to the performer an adequate knowledge of the musical discourse 
he or she will perform, acknowledging the immense amount of prescriptions that the mean brings. 
Thus, Time and Memory reach the Twentieth century as the two faces of a single and vital issue for 
music. Musical discourse is an eminently temporal discursive stream and, for this reason, triggers 
various levels of memory in its action. On the one hand, one can notice today in musical 
performance a disrepute of memorization as a necessary practice, due to the amplification of the 
recognition of its limitations. 2 On the other hand, the question of time and the possibility of 
memory are more present than ever in the conception of Contemporary Music, 3 and for this 
reason it is necessary to investigate its limits and definitions in order to understand how memory 
acts in the temporality of the performance beyond the mere memorization. 
2. The synthesis of times in musical performance
This digression through the Western history of the concept of time may be wearying but it is 
absolutely necessary to demonstrate that this topic is not a complete novelty and that our 
approach to time after musical performance is grounded on several parallel notions. However, 
performers are not usually the first to be listened to on this matter. If firstly we heard from 
philosophers, secondly are the composers, the ones not only to craft time musically but also to 
think on the subject conceptually, as follows.  
In the twentieth century, people witnessed the human conquest of space in as many spheres as 
possible, from the consolidation of geopolitical structures to celestial explorations, to the 
consummation and overcoming of classical mechanics in the new quantum era. The conquest of 
space, which had once moved thousands to the discovery of continents and territories, gave rise 
to a greater desire, the conquest of time. People still attempted to achieve the freedom to live 
where they wanted, but could people achieve equal liberation to live when they wanted and for 
how long? If Physics has taken important steps towards understanding and controlling matter and 
space, its postulates about time have further demonstrated how far man is in being able to say 
anything about it, even less to control it or operate it. Heavens and earth have been recreated, but 
the beginning remains. 
Space was also the great musical achievement of the early Twentieth century, especially when 
Anton Webern proposed the domain of musical space by means of the parts (Sätze) of music, 
recognizing that the synthesis of parts results in the expansion of space and that “only the union 
of parts can completely express the [musical] idea completely” (Webern 1963, 19). The space of the 
musical score itself thereby became a territory, and for that reason it required its own policy that 
prevented parts from destroying themselves and helped them build into a gathered whole. 
If Serial Music seems to be the consummation of understanding about the space of musical pitches 
and textures, in a similar way to Physics it exposes an even greater difficulty, which is to understand 
and operate musical time. It was in the face of this situation that French composer Olivier Messiaen 
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began to coin his infamous understanding of musical time from the Thomist categories of Time 
and Eternity, articulated alongside the Bergsonian concept of duration, thereby starting, if not a 
space race, a time race for the political domain of this dimension of music, albeit conceptually. By 
way of contextualization we can briefly list (Tab. 1) the main propositions on musical time in the 
second half of the twentieth century, mostly influenced to a greater or lesser extent by Messiaen's 
postulates: 
Obviously, the risk of superficiality is assumed when presenting such a brief panorama of a 
profound discussion, but this temerity is incurred only for giving a unifying outlook to perspectives 
often studied individually. Many other composers worked on the problem of time in their music, 
Table 1: Glossary of the main concepts of musical time in the second half of the 20th century 
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in the twentieth century, but this list contains those who also elaborated on the conceptual 
dimensions of this issue. Moreover, existing within their work as composers, a large part of these 
discussions were born within the scope of musical composition and therefore dealt with a reading 
of time that promoted not only comprehension but the possibility of writing that time. In this way, 
the interest of the concepts differs from the objective investigated here; namely, to understand 
not only how time is perceived in listening or how it is possible to do it in writing, but how the act 
of performance participates in the listener’s experience and understanding of time. 
This seems to be a difference eminently perspectival, but it has important consequences to be 
pointed out because although the concepts listed above offer themselves different points of view 
about musical time, most of them do not care about the situation of the performer or with the 
techno-aesthetics4 of musical discourse. The place of the performer cannot be simply in real time, 
because the performance brings within its momentum a series of other information previously 
studied (memory) and that comes consciously to the surface from the affectation of the score in 
the movements of the one that plays. Moreover, the performer is totally involved in a physical 
action and at the same time has to relate to sounds that have just been produced, already 
anticipating movements that will be done. 
At the same time, the physical energy put into performance creates an expense on each long note, 
each bow change, each breath; there is no purely smooth time for the one who performs music 
for the simple reason that it deals with information already prescribed (and prewritten), which he 
must organize into sets of actions that will effectively turn these actions into a sound that may 
sound like a smooth time-space. And even the pulse of performance is perhaps not so much that 
of the musical pulse, but that of every new fingering or change of position that scores and guides 
the arrow of time in performance. 
In Xenakis, this reality is somehow contemplated in his concept of temporal musical time; however, 
it is a time that the composer does not develop in his reading and which, as for example in the 
definition of out-of-time, proposes more compositional strategies tilted toward the mathematical 
bias. Even the idea of an irreversible time seems to have something reversible for the performer 
who either repeats a structure in his practice routine or who, as said, is anticipating the next 
movement while producing a sound that related to the previous one. 
Grisey, likewise, is still concerned with the division between subject and object, understanding that 
there is little of the skin of time that can be controlled, since it is of the subjective order of 
perception, leaving the flesh and the skeleton to be worked objectively in the composition. It may 
be said that the skeleton of time is largely the type of time in which performance takes place, not 
that it does not acquire its flesh, but because it is the points of reference used by the performer in 
his planning order, either be it the time of the metronome studied, or the inner groups of figures 
and gestures that, however grouped they may be in a larger idea, still persist in being themselves 
as individual characters of movement and sound, i.e., as individual bones. 
Stockhausen is perhaps the one who most ignores the performer; indeed, it was the composer's 
intention at that point since, from the electronic experience, he proposed rhythmic micro-divisions 
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on a scale humanly impracticable. It is curious that this concept is close to the definition of 
Zimmermann, geographically and historically, but considers different directions of the production 
of musical time; Stockhausen ignored an instance that for Zimmermann was fundamental, which 
was the physical set of actions put into practice in sound production. And it also poses in an 
antagonistic way to the positive consideration that the second concept of Zimmermann has on the 
historical relation integrated with the musical tradition, since Stockhausen proposes a radical 
overcoming of the past. 
For a performer who puts on the same music stand Frescobaldi, Bach, and Cage, history really has 
an unusual aspect of simultaneity; at once, the performer brings into existence discourses from 
distinct temporal origins, but which enter actual time together. As part of the bitemporal ontology 
of music, it really does not seem to make sense for the performer to ponder a musical time that 
does not consider to some extent the synchrony (and synchronicity) that the entire repertoire 
has. Perhaps this makes performance an inevitably conservative musical entity, in which 
composition seeks progress and rupture.  However, this tension is precisely what keeps music as 
music, in its movement to move forward in new ways, without giving up what has already been, 
since, inevitably, this is also the human way of making its existence ever new, while carrying marks 
of the previous ways. 
With the noted conceptual gap of a musical time for performance, it always seems necessary to 
return to the one from which this discussion always begins. Augustine, when inquiring on the 
possibility of memory in the face of the volatility of time, begins to understand that the present is 
the time in which both past and future find their synthesis. Memory is the possibility of the past to 
make itself present, albeit as a past, but a past “impelled” by the future that attracted it. Now, even 
eternity, finally, will be this present, but a present without a past or future, in a constant state of 
fullness. It seems to be in the present, therefore, that lies the key to understanding how the past 
and the future are present in musical performance (Augustine 2016, 11:15).  
This idea seems to be difficult to conceive because music thought is, in general, used to being 
structured in the metaphor of space, within the form of the score, where it is possible to see 
succession as an overlapping of parts. However, from the standpoint of performance, perhaps a 
recapitulation in the Tonic key may be as new as any new section. And it may be suggested that 
even listening can behave in a similar way. Edward Cone (1985) proposes something similar in 
stating that musical performance in its formative attribute is essentially rhythmic, understanding 
that “It is not, [as] the conventional analysis would have it, thematic, nor, pace Schenker, harmonic. 
Both of these aspects are important, but rhythm is basic” (149). Performance is a constant agency 
of gestures made in time that group sets of distinct pitches that only enter reality when attacked 
in time. Hence musical time has a transient attribute as the sound envelope itself in its identity. This 
is why Cone proposes that the performer is challenged to make real and sonorous the temporal 
structure proposed by the composer. 
Fritz Noske (1976) recalls a question of definition: when music is no longer understood as a type 
of action, leading to a conception of music as an object, it becomes as every object, having 
499 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 4 (2) (2019) 
form. Actions have categories of valuation and structuring but are hardly visible and valuable 
forms. Thus, musical form is born, by definition, from a music that is not action and, therefore, little 
or nothing has to do with performance. Noske then presents his thesis, which can be easily 
transposed from the compositional process to the interpretative process: 
Here we arrive at the vital point. The form of the completed musical work tells us 
very little about the process of composing. The indisputable fact that music does 
not really exist unless it is produced in sound implies “its character of being always 
generative”. Music is by definition a present participle. What we hear, what we sing, 
or what we play is not the form[ed] form, or the form formata , but the form forming 
itself, or the form formans. (Noske 1976, 45) 
Understanding the time of performance requires, therefore, overcoming a spatial and parametric 
description of music, assuming it as the embodiment of movements in time. The sound in motion is 
music taking form and therefore the form of performance. Noske proposes three basic and self-
explanatory concepts for understanding these forms of movements: acceleration, retardation, and 
stabilization (Noske 1976, 47). From those basic movements the experience of time expands, but 
more than that, time reconfigures itself in reality, when one considers the unity of reality. 
This proposal has some radical consequences, and not all of them have adequate space to be dealt 
with here, such as those of a more sociocultural nature. Noske himself suggests that the 
disobjetification of music is a painful process where much of what the musician brings as formation 
in the last centuries has to be re-evaluated. He considers, in his analysis of medieval music, that 
the music of the Twentieth century has the merit of retrieving the notion of music as an activity 
that structures time and that, as a movement, deals more with time than with space and more with 
the ethics than with the etiquette of the concert hall. 
To consider music as action involves withdrawing it from the merely notational and even from the 
sonorous realm, and dealing with the human condition which, as such, is integral in its physical 
and mental faculties. This point is implicit in Noske's proposition but becomes even more evident 
in the work of the Russian musicologist Boris Asafiev in his influential book Musical Form as a 
Process (1930). Although Asafiev's theory agrees with the point already made here about the time 
of the performance—a synthesis of past and future in the present—it is necessary to point out that 
his concept of musical movement takes into account more the movement of the musical parts than 
of the musical action itself (Asafiev cited in Tull 1977). 
After the initial question, Asafiev's proposition contributes greatly to the viability of a reading of 
musical time from the point of view of the performance time defended here as the extended 
present. The Russian musicologist proposes a general theory based on the premise that the musical 
form is the perception of the musical intonations by the audience, which in his theory of Marxist 
bias is society itself. Established musical forms are nothing more than intonation patterns 
sedimented socially by the mechanism of repetition. An idea proposed by Asafiev that helps in 
describing the temporality of musical performance is to speak of formation5 instead of form, thus 
understanding music as a process of the whole coming to be or a structural becoming. It is an 
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alagmatic process as proposed by Gilbert Simondon, where the mass of the brick is released 
gradually, taking shape in time. 
The intonations are a kind of energetical transduction, which builds on the initial energy of the 
composer’s writing, where this energy is in a potential state until its actualization into kinetic energy 
in performance, resulting in the energy of sound. This energy is the force involved in each 
connection, between either sounds, notes or harmonics, but all this potential energy is only 
actualized after an initial impulse, that is, the friction of the bow, the blowing on the mouthpiece or 
the pressing of the key. This impulse relates to another concept of Cone’s, that of “accent of 
weight,” which refers to points of articulation of the performance time, where movements—and 
we can use the three Noske categories here—receive a new discharge of energy. For Asafiev, the 
intonations are organized in three basic moments: impulse, movement, and ending. Within the idea 
of formation, an impulse is not only the initial impulse but can last for seconds, or even minutes, 
when a whole stream is made in order to accumulate enough energy to achieve a certain time; this 
may be a slow opening of a first movement or a levare measure; the point is, there are seconds 
and more "anachronistic" seconds, leading to a vanishing point. Taking the concept of intonation 
in its ultimate degree, Asafiev concludes that it is the basic manifestation of human consciousness, 
whether as an instrumental sound stream or as a verbal sonorous flow or even in the sum of both 
in music. 
After the propositions of Cone, Noske, and Asafiev, there seems to be enough conceptual 
repertoire to be undertaken in an attempt to read the applied music time from the performance 
data, where the performer actually stands as the “lord of time.” Viability exists not only in the 
philosophical and musicological fields but also in the understanding of the cognitive processes 
involved in performance, which have been demonstrated to be of an order not only of long and 
short-term memories but also of the peripheral neural complex, which recruits areas of the order 
of planning as well.6 
This is, then, our point: That musical performance thus demands another sense of time, 
an extended present where the whole being is applied in the actualization of a musical action 
between movement and sound and, at the same time, connects these movements and sounds to 
those just produced, already anticipating and planning the next technical step, listening internally 
to the next time or the next attack. But of course, even that description is out-of-time. All these 
movements happen simultaneously, like an energy that rationalization cannot contain. It is indeed 
a dilation of the present that promotes the synthesis of past and future in the performative act. 
Hours of practice, old affections, technical traditions: all joining the image of the next movement, 
the energy expenditure for the next sound production. 
The performer thus operates if not a spatial domain, then, minimally, the control of time. He or 
she becomes master of that temporal territory, not only shaping experience but time itself. 
Territorialization overcomes the spatial and controls the time of the interval, but also that of the 
“single sphere of history,” to use the categories of B. A. Zimmermann. The performance is the 
musical action that triggers the reterritorialization of that territory already demarcated by writing 
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and that is deterritorialized by the time lapse, or even by the communicative lapse between 
composer and performer, and between performer and audience. Finally, if the performer is the 
lord of time, he is a different type of landlord, serving the one with whom an alliance has been 
established—musical discourse—even though not receiving anything in return but understanding 
the responsibility to the call that, on the contrary, would only echo empty in the galleries of the 
palace. 
3. The performance of time: a formative reading
"... there is time to every purpose under the heaven." Singular purposes demand singular times. 
As demonstrated by the three musicological references we have seen, musical time, when analysed 
after the performative data, is a constant agency of the present, creating different densities of the 
living moment. As the several concepts of time coined by composers also prove, there are many 
interpretations of whatever entity or dimension we know as “time,” but the fact is that they all 
produce their own mark through the reality of musical time. There is time for all musical times 
under the heaven. However, few musicologists or composers have thought in their propositions 
about the possibility that musical ethics is less a matter of right and wrong and more a relation of 
either-or. There is time for all musical times to be made into music because music carries in itself 
a catholic, that is universal, attribute: people make music. From this anthropological universal, it is 
natural that the plural condition of humanity promotes diversity of interpretation from a given 
reality. Time is a reality, sometimes measurable, sometimes imponderable, but “To every thing 
there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven.” 
The second part of the first verse of the third chapter of the Biblical book of Ecclesiastes is precisely 
the subtitle of the solo cello Sonata written by Bernd Alois Zimmermann in 1960, in its Latin 
rendering “... et suis spatiis transeunt universa sub caelo.” The verse opens a new section of the book 
known as the “Poem of Time,” a set of eight parallel verses where the idea of a certain time is 
always contrasted with another concerning an uncertain time (Bartholomew 2009). The text deals 
with confidence in time even in the midst of temporal uncertainties. How can a farmer, for 
example, in the organic sense of the profession, rely on harvest time? The farmer does not know 
the time, nor the day, but safeguards the confidence that there will be a harvest. This kind of 
certainty seems reasonably uncertain to modern ears, which are disappointed by minutes of delay, 
since it refers to a cyclical conception of time, typical of the East from which the biblical text 
comes. This relationship is further clarified by looking at the translation made by the rabbis of the 
Septuagint when they translated the original Hebrew into Greek as "τοῖς πᾶσιν χρόνος καὶ καιρὸς 
τῷ παντὶ πράγματι ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανόν": everything has its chronos and there are kairós for all things 
under the heaven. 
If it is difficult to think of a life guided by the mere certainty of time without being able to control 
or measure it. Who would dare to imagine a piece of music based on the certainty of time but 
which ignores the metrification of this time? For it is precisely this reality, or that duality, that treats 
Zimmermann's sonata in his attempt to translate into music a question that perhaps other kinds 
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of discourse would not deal with. This duality can lead to two attitudes towards such antinomy: on 
the one hand rejoicing in certainty, on the other the despair of uncertainty. Zimmermann 
personally lived for the second reading, a very present image in his music, where six pieces bring 
excerpts from the same biblical book as the theme but that ultimately lead to the deep depression 
that culminate in his tragic suicide. 
People make music while there is life because life is only in time. Thus, from the gravitational waves 
to the position shift on the musical instrument, vital energy only finds its wholeness in the affection 
embodied in the logos, in itself and in the other. Zimmermann proposes in the discourse of his 
sonata a conflict between the times that in the end are one, a time linked to the energetic micro-
articulations and another one that concerns the history of human deeds. 
This proposition was born in a more consolidated way in his influential text Interval und 
Zeit (Interval and Time), written in 1957. The article is itself the fruit of a conflicting dialogue with 
Stockhausen, who, around the same years, developed his own reading of musical time, the result 
of which was quite antagonistic to his. For Zimmermann, the basic unit of time was not in the note 
and its duration, as Stockhausen would suggest in his theory of Time Unity, but in the connection 
between notes and sounds, in the interval. The interval is the energy of the sound-musical 
becoming applied in the connection to the next actualization, and so the time itself is 
actualized. The interval assumes two typologies: successive in horizontal (melodic) musical 
settings and simultaneous in vertical (harmonic) musical settings, resulting both in the basic 
temporal math of the music, or its fundamental form (Grund-form). If musical time finds its 
becoming in the interval, both successive and simultaneous, it denotes an elasticity of time where 
in reality what happens is a dilation of the present. Zimmermann joins the Augustinian-sounding 
concept coined by poet Ezra Pound (1885–1972) as real time (Wirkliche Zeit), the idea of a time 
effected in a continuous present, where what separates the past from the future are agency levels 
and not the reality of actions. Thus, from Bach to Zimmermann the distance resides in distinct 
temporal agencies that were made in time in the same single mesh, or in the same sphere of time. 
Music remains with its two basic units: sound and movement; and musical actions have only the 
both as material means to weave time. Between Palestrina, the Beatles, or the Bororo ethnicity, 
the distance lies in the way each agency crafts musical materials in their own fabric of reality, which 
is finally integrated into the same everlasting sphere of time, which had a beginning, but not an 
end. In this sense, musical actions modulate time through their “effective temporal durations” 
(Zimmermann 1957), not as a chronometric duration, but as the energy of the musical movement 
reaching its becoming in Time. 
Although Zimmermann did not aim at the “monopoly on the theme of ‘Time’” (Zimmermann, 1958), 
his proposition is undoubtedly the one that proposes a more comprehensive understanding of 
musical time with the movement from composition to performance. For this reason, his discourse 
fully converses with the performer, constituting a direct relation of performative affectations and, 
consequently, of a performance time aligned with the time prescribed by the composer, which is 
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especially notable in his cello sonata where the concept of Time is explicitly the great creative 
question. 
The Sonata has five main sections, each consisting of disconnected and independent systems, as 
described in the following list: 
Each system is juxtaposed graphically next to the other without any causality between the 
figurative structures, and the performer must execute them as individual entities, separating each 
new idea with a pause ad libitum, according to Zimmermann's own notes. Perhaps the most 
notable and important proposal for this analysis is Zimmermann's annotation where he instructs 
the performer to execute the systems without any numerical order, changing the order between 
the systems as random execution boxes (Ingenhütt 1983, 11). Although this proposal has been 
abandoned in the later manuscripts, this is undoubtedly a piece of fundamental information to 
validate the claim that there is no structural causality within the Sonata's musical disposition. Even 
so, Zimmermann maintains an almost impromptu timeline, one of the dimensions he most 
admired in American jazz in its ability to flexibly actualize musical time. 
Besides reading the temporal effectiveness of the musical gesture,7 it is possible to suggest a 
reading of the time dilations not only in successive intervals of the same written duration but also 
from the dilations written by the composer in structures. In the second section, Phase, there is a 
succession of gestures whose own written duration already suggests these simultaneous flows of 
dilations (Fig. 2, next page): 
Table 2: List of sections of the Zimmermann Sonata with the respective number of systems 
504 PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY VOL 4 (2) (2019) 
Fig. 2: Zimmermnann, Sonata, p. 2, 
s. 2. Upper lines (red): gestural-
temporal macro-articulation; Bot-
tom lines (blue): gestural-temporal 
micro-articulation. With the indica-
tion of the movements of Noske, 
where - = stabilization, → = accel-
eration and ← = retardation 
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What occurs in the time of performance within this system is primarily a stable A-flat that increases 
the dilation of time when it is succeeded by the simultaneous interval between the A-natural and 
the B-flat. Afterward begins the profusion of gestures in simultaneous joints here distinguished in 
micro and macro, where on the one hand there is a great division of the pulse and, at the same 
time, species of grooves in these macro-divisions that undulate the micro-articulation of the time 
in small movements often opposite between levels. When finally there is stability, with  the groups 
of thirty-second notes, actually there are changes of impulses through the bow, granting a kind of 
accelerating motor. This type of overlapping is very common throughout the sections of the sonata, 
but it may be worth mentioning a case in the manuscript where Zimmermann points out the 
temporal elasticity promoted by the succession, which at the same time is stable in its durations, 
produces retardations and accelerations in its exchange of attack modes (Fig. 3): 
Perhaps the most striking example of temporal effectiveness in the performance dilation of time 
where the future touches the present through its anticipations is in an excerpt from the Phase 
section, wherein its ninth system (Fig. 4) there is only one B-flat, played by several different modes. 
The interesting thing is that even though the pitch is the same, the editor outlines a path, perhaps 
the best possible, to perform the excerpt, where everything is an anticipation for the next system. 
This is because the first B-flat is made with the finger 3 on the A-string, the most easily achievable 
because of its proximity to the natural harmonic. Then finger 3 is replaced by the thumb, which in 
turn makes it possible to access the same B-flat with the third finger on the D-string, which will also 
be replaced by the thumb. Such large numbers of movements would seem futile, but, in fact, 
already anticipate the next system in its demands. In system 10 (Fig. 5), the fact that the thumb is 
already in the B-flat of the D-string will allow safe access to the D-above that B-flat and the 
positioning of the thumb in the same position, but in the G-string. This is an evident example of 
what is said about the temporality of performance, where past and future are embedded in the 
present. 
Fig. 3: Zimmermann, Sonata, p. 4, s. 4, upper line (red): natural harmonic in pizzicato; intermediate line 
(black): notes produced only by the impact of the left hand fingers on tapping; bottom row (green): left hand 
pizzicati. (Source: Composer's manuscript/Akademie der Künste Berlin) 
Fig. 4: Zimmermann, Sonata, p. 3, s. 9 
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By mean of these examples, the mechanisms of time modulation that Zimmermann applies in his 
writing are somewhat more clear, demonstrating that his conception of time goes far beyond mere 
theoretical speculation, unfolding into an absolutely sophisticated practice. At the same time, it is 
fundamental to understand that these levels of time articulation modulate discourse in its totality 
at even more complex levels than the simultaneity of the system. The same section or movement 
has several of these overlaps that create, in turn, a succession of these dilations. It would be 
possible to go further by listing a level still higher where the reading counts the affectation in time 
between the sections, resulting in a large arc, but this relation seems to inhabit a perceptible plane 
of a hard application within the performative process. Thus, the way in which Zimmermann deals 
with the antinomy of the certain time against an uncertain time becomes more and more 
detectable, as does the ways he modulates the performer through his technical writing of the 
times. Obviously, the result is a piece of extreme complexity, demanding a great opening of the 
performer to play all layers as written, a process of slow and gradual development. Fortunately, 
there is time for every purpose under heaven. 
4. The end of time 
Much has been said about time, and yet it seems to remain indecipherable as if it were alien to 
human lucubrations about its existence or functioning. This durability mesh continues in weaving, 
in a progressive spin where the loom is the present in its energy and intensity. However, among so 
many temporal and time-making actions, music remains in place of honor, perhaps because it is 
something closer to an art that makes time sonorous. The fact is that if there is really a time, 
perhaps there is no more appropriate instance for one to know it than music, especially if one 
performs it. 
Memory, in turn, is the return path to Time, connecting and reconnecting past to present. Even in 
front of a score, the concert music performer is engaged in an intense activity of retrieving 
memories of distinct levels and at the same time planning and anticipating what will come in a 
state of an extended present. The imponderable seems to be on another level in performance, not 
so much as who does not know what will come, but as the one who does not know how it will come. 
Perhaps Paul Ricoeur is right in suggesting a certain attribute of monstration to artistic making, an 
overcoming of historical time that bestows on actions like music an everlasting state, like the 
angels. As a piece of sempiternal music may be known, but only in what it chooses to show itself, 
perhaps it reveas distinct faces in different times, while always ministering the affections inscribed 
therein (Ricoeur 1996, 2). 
Fig. 5: Zimmermann, Sonata, p. 3, s. 10. 
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Facing this situation, one only has to wait with Messiaen for the coming of the Angel of the 
Apocalypse, to whom he dedicated his Quartet to the end of time, who will finally pronounce that 
“there shall be no more time.” This quote, which is found in chapter ten, verse six of the Book of 
Revelation, literally says in Greek such words, although in most translations “time” appears as 
“delay.” Perhaps because of theological fears of imagining a time without time, since only God 
could inhabit Eternity and be Eternal, translations choose to interpret the text as “there will be no 
more delay,” but it is not what the text says. The original states ὅτι χρόνος οὐκέτι ἔσται, or "there 
will be no more chronos." Probably the time of the escathon is not, in fact, eternal but neither does 
it need to be immanentized to be understood. It can be a constant state of now, the fullness of the 
present that, full of it, does not see another time than that. After that, all the mentions of “time” in 
Revelation refer to it as kairós, the time full of meaning, where the eternal touches the temporal; 
the almost nothing that becomes in almost everything, having in the music here a glimpse of the 
world of the end of the times, where time has no end. 
1 Bergson is a fundamental philosophical reference for the perspective held by the composer Olivier Messiaen, as 
it is clear in his writings. See Messiaen (1944). 
2 As a journalist in the New York Times (Tommasini 2012) noted recently, the importance of performance by 
memory has been drastically decreased in the world's largest concert halls, mainly because of the recognition of 
its limitation as “memorization of a reading” in relation to the freedom that the score offers to the performer to 
have contact with the presence of the other material, in this case, the presence of the composer. 
3 As demonstrated by Brian Ferneyhough (1993) in his key-note lecture in Darmstadt. 
4 We claim here for the concept coined by Gilbert Simondon referring to the aesthetical experience of the one 
who performs an artistic action and not only the point of view of the one who perceives this action. See Simondon 
(2012).  
5 Proposed here more in the sense of Gestaltung than Entstehung 
6 It is mainly considered in the research of Caroline Palmer, in works like Palmer (2006) and Palmer (2005). 
7 An analysis of the temporal effectiveness of the musical gesture in Zimmermann’s Sonata can be seen in Teixeira 
and Ferraz (2017).  
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